The Price for Driving While Intoxicated: Should It Be Blood? by Carabillo, Laura Ellen
Pace Law Review
Volume 4
Issue 1 Fall 1983 Article 6
September 1983
The Price for Driving While Intoxicated: Should It
Be Blood?
Laura Ellen Carabillo
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Laura Ellen Carabillo, The Price for Driving While Intoxicated: Should It Be Blood?, 4 Pace L. Rev. 115
(1983)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/6
Notes and Comments
The Price for Driving While Intoxicated:
Should it be Blood?
I. Introduction
Despite significant efforts at the state level aimed at elimi-
nating the drunk driver' from state highways," it is ironic that
the evidence most likely to establish the driver's degree of intox-
ication, a blood alcohol content (BAC) test, still encounters ad-
missibility obstacles. Controversy has long surrounded the issue
of whether the state can compel a driver to submit to a blood
test to establish the driver's BAC.3 The New York Court of Ap-
1. A driver is defined as "a person who operates or drives or is in actual physical
control of a vehicle." N.Y. VRH. & TRAF. LAW § 113 (McKinney Supp. 1981). This discus-
sion focuses upon a driver impaired by alcohol. The issue of a driver impaired by drugs,
although analogous to drunk driving, is not developed.
2. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 1678-1678j (McKinney Supp. 1982). Referred
to as STOP-DWI (Special Traffic Options Program for Driving While Intoxicated), the
program's purpose is to "provide a plan for coordination of county, town, city and village
efforts to reduce alcohol-related traffic injuries and fatalities." Id. at § 1678-c(1). A
county which chooses to participate in the program is provided with the funds to support
it. Id. at § 1678-a(1).
New York is one of several states employing roadblocks in an attempt to detect
drunk drivers. Noted for their proliferation on holiday weekends, the roadblocks are set
up by the police who indiscriminately stop drivers and look for signs of drinking. Recog-
nized as warrantless searches, the roadblocks are receiving strong criticism for their in-
trusion upon a driver's interest in privacy. Defenders of the program stress the need for
balancing an individual driver's interest in privacy with the state's interest in detecting a
drunk driver. Flaherty, As Roadblocks Proliferate, Questions of Legality Persist, The
Nat'l L.J., July 25, 1983, at 3, col. 2.
3. See N.Y. STATE JOINT COMM. ON MOTOR VEHICLE PROBLEMS, CHEMICAL TESTS FOR
INTOXICATION, 3 N.Y. Doc. No. 25, 176th N.Y. Leg. 17 (1953). In drafting the first im-
plied consent statute in the nation, thereby permitting the state to obtain blood tests
from drivers to establish their blood alcohol content (BAC), the drafting commission
recognized a potential conflict between the interests of the state and the drivers. The
commission would have drafted the statute to permit obtaining the test over drivers'
objections except for the state attorney general's opinion that drivers should not be sub-
jected to blood tests they did not want. Id. at 17. See infra notes 14-15 and accompany-
ing text.
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peals' ruling in People v. Moselle4 attempted to quell this dis-
pute by focusing upon the nature of the driver's consent to the
BAC test. The court ruled that a BAC test obtained in the ab-
sence of a court order or a driver's actual consent was inadmissi-
ble in Penal Law proceedings.5 Consent to a BAC test as implied
through operation of section 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law
(VTL)6 validated use of the test only in proceedings brought
under the VTL.7 The ruling reinforced the policy favored in
New York of not compelling a driver to submit to a blood test.0
The practical result was the exclusion of the BAC tests in the
three cases, involving drunk drivers and deceased victims,' con-
solidated in Moselle.
The New York legislature's reaction to Moselle's result
came one year later. The legislature revised the VTL, Penal Law
and Criminal Procedure Law (CPL).10 By enacting the revisions,
the legislature intended to eliminate a driver's ability to refuse a
BAC test if another individual had been killed or suffered seri-
ous physical injury due to the driver's operation of a motor vehi-
cle.1 Thus, when specific statutory provisions are complied with,
a driver's consent to a BAC test is unnecessary.
4. 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (192).
5. Id. at 101, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
6. N.Y. VsH. & TRit. LAw § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1982), amended by Compulsory
Chemical Tests for Intoxication, ch. 481, § 1194(2), 1983 N.Y. Laws 882, 882-83 (effective
on the ninetieth day following July 15, 1983). This statute is commonly referred to as the
implied consent statute. References throughout this Note to the implied consent statute
are, unless otherwise specified, to the version in effect prior to Oct. 15, 1983. This version
is cited as N.Y. VEH. & Tit. LAw § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
The abbreviation VTL is used throughout this Note to designate the New York Ve-
hicle and Traffic Law.
Moselle was decided under a version of the implied consent statute in effect prior to
passage of the Compulsory Chemical Tests for Intoxication, ch. 481, § 1194(2), 1983 N.Y.
Laws 882, 882-83.
7. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 101, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
8. See supra note 3.
9. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 104, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294. The three
cases consolidated in Moselle are: People v. Moselle, (Erie County Ct. Dec. 7, 1981);
People v. Daniel, 84 A.D.2d 916, 446 N.Y.S.2d 658 (4th Dep't 1981); and People v. Wol-
ter, 83 A.D.2d 187, 444 N.Y.S.2d 331 (4th Dep't 1981).
10. Compulsory Chemical Tests for Intoxication, ch. 481, § 1194(2), 1983 N.Y. Laws
882, 882-83.
11. New York State Assembly Memorandum in Support of Legislation - Purpose
or General Idea of Bill, accompanying Bill No. 4178. This Bill was enacted as Compul-
sory Chemical Tests for Intoxication, ch. 481, § 1194(2), 1983 N.Y. Laws 882, 882-83.
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Part II of this note explores the confusion in statutory and
case law which spurred the New York Court of Appeals to con-
sider People v. Moselle." Part III presents the factual back-
ground of the three cases consolidated in Moselle and the court's
decision. Part IV examines the deficiencies in the Moselle ruling
and discusses alternative solutions. Part V concludes that VTL
section 1194-a reflects a shift in emphasis from protecting the
interests of a drunk driver to protecting those of an innocent
victim.
II. Background
A. Blood Alcohol Content Testing Pursuant to a Driver's Ac-
tual or Implied Consent
A driver's actual consent to a BAC test yields evidence ad-
missible in VTL and Penal Law proceedings.13 Absent a driver's
actual consent, opinion has varied as to the admissibility of the
test. In formulating the nation's first implied consent statute in
1953, the New York drafting commission noted two conflicting
policies: its own view which favored compelling a driver to sub-
mit to a blood test despite the individual's wishes, versus the
state attorney general's view that an individual should not be
compelled to submit to a test. " In deference to the attorney gen-
eral's opinion, the commission included in the statute a means
by which a driver could refuse a blood test."5
12. 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982).
13. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 101, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293; accord Peo-
ple v. Biester, 24 A.D.2d 1021, 1022, 266 N.Y.S.2d 46, 48 (2d Dep't 1965) (Hopkins, J.,
dissenting) (had the only issue in a N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney Supp.
1982), see infra note 26, proceeding been the consent given by the defendant to a blood
test, and the jury been provided evidence from which they could conclude that the de-
fendant had consented to the test, then the blood test would have been ruled admissi-
ble); People v. Flynn, 73 Misc. 2d 178, 340 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Seneca County Ct. 1973) (a
blood test from a defendant charged with second degree manslaughter was proper evi-
dence for consideration by a grand jury for the defendant was found to have consented
to the testY.
14. N.Y. STATE JOINT COMM. ON MOTOR VEHICLE PROBLEMS, CHEMICAL TESTS FOR
INTOXICATION, 3 N.Y. Doc. No. 25, 176th N.Y. Leg. 17 (1953). See supra note 3.
15. The implied consent statute, as originally enacted, provided:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle or motorcycle in this state shall be
deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test of his breath, blood, urine or
saliva for the purposes of determining the alcoholic content of his blood provided
that such test is administered at the direction of a police officer having reasonable
1983]
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In 1966, the Supreme Court ruled in Schmerber v. Califor-
nia16 that an individual has no constitutional right to refuse a
blood test for use in criminal driving while intoxicated (DWI)
proceedings, provided there is probable cause to suspect the in-
dividual of DWI and the test itself is conducted in a reasonable
manner.17 This ruling effectively eliminated not only the need to
include in the implied consent statute a means by which a driver
could refuse a test but also the need for the statute itself. Con-
sent, according to the Supreme Court, was no longer an issue in
blood testing. Despite Schmerber, New York chose to continue
its policy of affording a driver the opportunity to refuse a blood
grounds to suspect such person of driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. If such person refuses to submit to such test the test shall not be given but
the commissioner shall revoke his license or permit to drive and any nonresident
operating privilege.
Ch. 854, § 71-a, 1953 N.Y. Laws 1167.
In Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. Orange County
1954), this implied consent statute was challenged on the constitutional grounds of self-
incrimination, unreasonable search and seizure, and violations of due process and equal
protection. The court rejected each of these challenges except due process. The statute
was ruled to violate due process because it failed to limit its application to cases where
there had been a valid arrest prior to a driver being subjected to a blood test or where
there had been a hearing prior to the revocation of a license. Id. at 54, 127 N.Y.S.2d at
128. The 1954 amendment to the implied consent statute included provisions for prior
arrest and a hearing. Ch. 320, § 71-a(1), 1954 N.Y. Laws 406 (amending ch. 854, § 71-
a(1), 1953 N.Y. Laws 1167).
16. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
17. Id. Schmerber was under arrest for the criminal offense of DWI at the time the
blood sample he had refused on advise of counsel was collected. The Supreme Court
rejected each of Schmerber's constitutional challenges to the state's ability to compel an
individual to submit to a blood test. In addressing Schmerber's fifth amendment claim,
the Court classified a blood sample as "real or physical evidence." Id. at 764. Since the
fifth amendment proscribed compelled communicative or testimonial evidence and a
blood sample was neither, no self-incrimination existed. Id. at 760-65.
In dismissing Schmerber's fourth amendment arguments, the Court held that the
bodily intrusion resulting from the collection of the blood sample was justifiable, reason-
able and done in a proper manner. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a warrant was not
necessary to obtain the blood since the exigent circumstance of a time lapse resulting in
the destruction of evidence existed. Id. at 766-72.
Constitutional challenges under the sixth and fourteenth amendments were also re-
jected. Schmerber claimed that administration of the blood test over his refusal, on the
advice of counsel, violated his "Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel." Id.
at 766. The Court rejected this claim by reasoning that since the defendant had no right
to refuse the test, he gained no additional right by turning to his counsel for advice. Id.
at 765-66. In rejecting Schmerber's fourteenth amendment due process claim, the Court
noted that the blood test had been conducted "by a physician in a simple, medically
acceptable manner in a hospital environment." Id. at 759.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/6
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test by preserving the implied consent statute."' Although the
statute underwent several revisions, 19 this underlying policy sur-
vived unchanged until 1983.2
18. The implied consent statute, as in effect until Oct. 15, 1983, provided in relevant
part:
1. Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to
have given his consent to a chemical test of his breath, blood, urine, or saliva for
the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content of his blood provided
that such test is administered at the direction of a police officer:
(1) having reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been operating
in violation of any subdivision of section eleven hundred ninety-two and within
two hours after such person has been placed under arrest for any such violation,
or
(2) within two hours after a breath test, as provided in section eleven hundred
ninety-three-a of this chapter, indicates that alcohol has been consumed by such
person and in accordance with the rules and regulations established by the police
force of which he is a member.
2. If such person having been placed under arrest or after a breath test indi-
cates the presence of alcohol in his system and having thereafter been requested
to submit to such chemical test and having been informed that his license or per-
mit to drive and any non-resident operating privilege shall be immediately sus-
pended and subsequently revoked for refusal to submit to such chemical test,
whether or not he is found guilty of the charge for which he is arrested, refuses to
submit to such chemical test, the test shall not be given and a written report of
such refusal shall be immediately made by the police officer before whom such
refusal was made.
N.Y. VEH. & Tar. LAW § 1194(1)-(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982), amended by Compulsory
Chemical Tests for Intoxication, ch. 481, § 1194(2), 1983 N.Y. Laws 882, 882-83. For a
thorough analysis of the development of the implied consent statute through mid-1975,
see King & Tipperman, The Offense of Driving While Intoxicated The Development of
Statutory and Case Law in New York, 3 HOPsTRA L. REV 541 (1975).
As amended by Compulsory Chemical Tests for Intoxication, ch. 481, § 1194(2), 1983
N.Y. Laws 882, 882-83, VTL § 1194(2) provides in relevant part:
If such person having been placed under arrest or after a breath test indicates
the presence of alcohol in his system and having thereafter been requested to sub-
mit to such chemical test and having been informed that his license or permit to
drive and any non-resident operating privilege shall be immediately suspended
and subsequently revoked for refusal to submit to such chemical test, whether or
not he is found guilty of the charge for which he is arrested, refuses to submit to
such chemical test, unless a court order has been granted pursuant to section
eleven hundred ninety-four-a of this chapter, the test shall not be given and a
written report of such refusal shall be immediately made by the police officer
before whom such refusal was made.
Id. (amending N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982)) (emphasis
added).
19. See N.Y. VE.H. & TRAr. LAW § 1194 annot. (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1982).
20. Compulsory Chemical Tests for Intoxication, ch. 481, § 1194-a, 1983 N.Y. Laws
882, 883-85, amends the implied consent statute by eliminating a driver's ability to re-
fuse a blood test if a court order for the test is obtained in compliance with the pertinent
19831
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Under the version of the implied consent statute in effect
until October 15, 1983, a driver who took advantage of the privi-
lege of driving2' within the state was deemed to have consented
to a blood test for use in VTL proceedings.22 To activate the
state's right to conduct the blood test, the driver had to be ei-
ther under arrest or subjected to a breath test indicating the
presence of alcohol. 23 A driver's actual refusal was necessary to
prevent the test from being conducted. 24 Actual consent, how-
ever, was not needed since consent was implied by the statute.5
When cases involving the implied consent statute surfaced,
the courts were presented with two procedural issues. First, in
what proceedings could a blood test complying with the statute
be used and second, what effect does noncompliance with the
statutory provisions. See infra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
21. Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 273, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (Sup. Ct. Mont-
gomery County 1955); Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 47, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116, 121-22
(Sup. Ct. Orange County 1954).
22. This is the basic premise of the implied consent statute. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.
LAW § 1194(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
23. Id. Absent an arrest, a breath test provides an objective basis for administering
a blood test. It removes the necessity of relying upon the observations of an eye-witness
or a police officer. If the result of a breath test indicates that alcohol has been consumed,
the officer can request the driver to submit to a blood test provided the officer also in-
forms the driver of the consequences of a refusal. If the driver refuses, the officer will
suspend the driver's license, thus preventing the driver who is suspected of DWI from
driving away from the scene. See id. at § 1194(2); 13 AKRON L. REV. 731 (1980).
The legal validity of the breath test was established in New York in People v. Don-
aldson, 36 A.D.2d 37, 319 N.Y.S.2d 172 (4th Dep't 1971). The scientific validity of the
breath test, however, has been questioned recently. A manufacturer of a series of breath
testing equipment has noted the possibility of radio transmissions interfering with the
test units and causing false readings of the driver's degree of intoxication. These radio
transmissions may emanate from such sources as radio and television stations and police
installations. See Smith & Wesson, Customer Advisory - Guidelines for Radio Fre-
quency Interference Testing, All Breathalyzerg Models, Sept. 10, 1982.
24. N.Y. VEH. & TRAY. LAW § 1194(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982). See supra note 18.
See People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 108, 385 N.E.2d 584, 588, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845, 850
(1978). A driver must be afforded the opportunity to refuse the test. N.Y. VEH. & TRAY.
LAW § 1194(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982). "An examination of the legislative history [of
the implied consent statute] reveals that the primary reason for allowing an individual to
refuse to take a blood test was to avoid the unpleasant situation of forcibly taking blood
from a recalcitrant donor." People v. Paddock, 29 N.Y.2d 504, 506, 272 N.E.2d 486, 487,
323 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977 (1971) (Jasen, J., concurring) (citing N.Y. STATE JOINT COMM. ON
MOTOR VEHICLE PROBLEMS, CHEMICAL TESTS FOR INTOXICATION, 3 N.Y. Doc. No. 25, 176th
N.Y. Leg. (1953)).
25. See People v. Kelty, 95 Misc. 2d 246, 247-48, 406 N.Y.S.2d 972, 973 (Dist. Ct.
Nassau County 1978).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/6
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statute have on the admissibility of a blood test. Compliance
with the provisions of the implied consent statute yielded a
blood test admissible in VTL section 1192 proceedings.2 6 Non-
compliance with the provisions yielded a blood test inadmissible
in VTL section 1192(2) proceedings.2 The courts differed, how-
ever, as to the admissibility of a noncomplying blood test in pro-
ceedings brought under VTL section 1192(3).28 Courts ruling the
noncomplying blood test inadmissible reasoned that the implied
consent statute provided the exclusive means, absent actual con-
sent or a court order, by which a driver's blood test could be
obtained.21 Courts admitting the noncomplying blood test rea-
soned that nothing in the VTL precluded its use.30Courts also differed when determining the admissibility of a
blood test obtained pursuant to the provisions of the VTL im-
plied consent statute in proceedings brought under the Penal
Law. In People v. O'Donnell," the court ruled a blood test com-
plying with the implied consent statute inadmissible as to the
Penal Law charge of criminal negligence. In People v. Daniel,s2
however, the intermediate court ruled a complying blood test
admissible under the Penal Law charge of criminally negligent
26. N.Y. VEH. & TRu. LAW § 1192 (McKinney Supp. 1982) provides in relevant
part:
2. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while he has .10 of one per centum
or more by weight of alcohol in his blood as shown by chemical analysis of his
blood, breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven
hundred ninety-four of this chapter.
3. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while he is in an intoxicated
condition.
Id. at § 1192(2)-(3).
Section 1195(1) provides:
Upon the trial of any action or proceeding arising out of actions alleged to have
been committed by any person arrested for a violation of any subdivision of sec-
tion eleven hundred ninety-two, the court shall admit evidence of the amount of
alcohol or drugs in the defendant's blood pursuant to the provisions of section
eleven hundred ninety-four of this Chapter.
Id.
27. See People v. Blowers, 79 Misc. 2d 462, 465, 360 N.Y.S.2d 369, 373 (Rensselaer
County Ct. 1974).
28. N.Y. VEH. & TR. LAW § 1192(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982). See supra note 26.
29. See People v. Daniel, 84 A.D.2d 916, 916, 446 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (4th Dep't
1981); People v. Wolter, 83 A.D.2d 187, 190, 444 N.Y.S.2d 331, 333 (4th Dep't 1981).
30. See People v. Blowers, 79 Misc. 2d at 465, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
31. 30 A.D.2d 731, 291 N.Y.S.2d 233 (3d Dep't 1968).
32. 84 A.D.2d at 917, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
1983]
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homicide. According to the Daniel court, the language of VTL
section 1195(1) 8" permitted this result."
In People v. Blowers,5 a blood test obtained in contraven-
tion of the implied consent statute, although inadmissible in a
VTL section 1192(2) proceeding, was admissible under VTL sec-
tion 1192(3), and for charges of reckless driving, criminally neg-
ligent homicide and second degree manslaughter.36
B. Blood Testing Pursuant to a Court Order
Two statutory provisions covering the issuance of a court
order to obtain a blood test are the CPL discovery statute and
search warrant statute.
1. The CPL Discovery Statute
The anticipated effect of Article 240 of the CPL,3 7 which
sets forth the means of discovering material from either a defen-
dant or prosecutor by demand and upon motion, was to avoid
surprise at trial."' The purpose of the discovery statute, CPL
section 240.40,19 which permits discovery by either party of ma-
33. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982). See supra note 26.
34. People v. Daniel, 84 A.D.2d at 917, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
35. 79 Misc. 2d 462, 360 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Rensselaer County Ct. 1974).
36. Id. at 463, 465-66, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 371, 373-74.
37. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW §§ 240.10-.90 (McKinney 1982).
38. In approving this Article, Governor Carey stated: "The enactment of these mea-
sures will have a significant impact on the criminal justice process. The element of sur-
prise in criminal trials and its inherent unfairness, will be reduced." Governor's Memo-
randum on approving L.1979, cs. 412 and 413, 1979 N.Y. Laws 1801.
39. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40(2) (McKinney 1982), amended by Compulsory
Chemical Tests for Intoxication, ch. 481, § 240.40, 1983 N.Y. Laws 882, 885 [hereinafter
cited as N.Y. VEH. & TRAt. LAW § 240.40(2) (McKinney 1982)], provides in relevant part-
2. Upon motion of the prosecutor, and subject to constitutional limitation, the
court in which an indictment, superior court information, prosecutor's information
or information is pending; (a) must order discovery as to any property not dis-
closed upon a demand pursuant to section 240.30, if it finds that the defendant's
refusal to disclose such material is not justified; and (b) may order the defendant
to provide non-testimonial evidence. Such order may, among other things, require
the defendant to: . . . (v) Permit the taking of samples of blood, hair or other
materials from his body in a manner not involving an unreasonable intrusion
thereof or a risk of serious physical injury thereto ....
This subdivision shall not be construed to limit, expand, or otherwise affect
the issuance of a similar court order, as may be authorized by law, before the filing
of an accusatory instrument consistent with such rights as the defendant may de-
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/6
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terial upon motion and court order when "an indictment. . . or
information is pending,' 0 was interpreted as being to correct
the existing discovery process which was considered "haphazard
and unregulated.' 41 A court order issued pursuant to the discov-
ery statute was not intended "to limit, expand, or otherwise af-
fect the issuance of a similar court order, as [might] be author-
ized by law, before the filing of an accusatory instrument.' 4
One type of material discoverable through a court order is-
sued pursuant to the discovery statute is a defendant's blood
sample.'" This statute has been used by the prosecution to ob-
tain a blood sample from a defendant for comparison purposes44
and by the defendant to obtain the result of a blood test con-
ducted previously." In each of these situations, the criminal
prosecutions had already been in progress.
2. The CPL Search Warrant Statute
Article 690 of the CPL" provides another authority for the
issuance of a court order for a blood test. This Article defines a
search warrant as a court order authorizing a police officer to
conduct a search of a "designated person, for the purpose of
rive from the constitution of this state or of the United States.
Id.
40. Id.
41. Memorandum of Office of Court Administration discussing the text of ch. 412
proposed § 240.40, 1979 N.Y. Laws 1889.
42. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40(2) (McKinney 1982). See supra note 39.
43. Id. at § 240.40(2)(b)(v). See supra note 39.
44. See People v. Natoli, 109 Misc. 2d 49, 442 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1982) (defendant charged with grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property
was compelled pursuant to a court order issued under CPL § 240.40(2)(b)(v) to submit to
a blood test for comparison purposes); People v. Trocchio, 107 Misc. 2d 610, 435
N.Y.S.2d 639 (Suffolk County Ct. 1980) (a court order issued pursuant to CPL §
240.40(2)(b)(v) compelled a defendant charged with two counts of sodomy to submit to
saliva and blood tests to compare the defendant's samples to blood found on articles of
clothing).
45. See People v. Inness, 69 Misc. 2d 429, 326 N.Y.S.2d 669 (Westchester County
Ct. 1971) (defendant charged with VTL and Penal Law violations was entitled to obtain
the result of his blood test from the prosecution); People v. North, 96 Misc. 2d 637, 409
N.Y.S.2d 482 (Amherst Town Ct. 1978) (defendant charged with driving while intoxi-
cated was entitled to receive from the prosecution pursuant to CPL § 240.40(1) the result
of a blood test conducted after his arrest).
46. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 690.05-.55 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1982).
1983]
9
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:115
seizing designated property.' 7 Property is subject to seizure if it
"tends to demonstrate that an offense was committed or that a
particular person participated in the commission of an of-
fense.""' A search warrant may be obtained by filing a written or
oral application.' 9
The New York Court of Appeals considered the applicabil-
ity of a search warrant to the collection of a blood sample in In
re Abe A. 50 The defendant, a suspect in a homicide investiga-
tion, had refused to submit to a blood test. 1 Since the purpose
of obtaining the defendant's blood sample was for comparison
with blood found at the scene of the homicide, the court rea-
soned that the defendant's blood was property which might tend
to demonstrate " 'that a particular person participated in the
commission of an offense.' ",52 Thus an Article 690 search war-
rant was a proper means of obtaining the suspect's blood
sample.53
47. Id. at § 690.05(2) (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1982).
48. Id. at § 690.10(4) (McKinney 1971).
49. Id. at § 690.35(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982). "[A]n oral application may be com-
municated to a judge by telephone, radio or other means of electronic communication."
Id. at § 690.36(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
In support of the enactment of CPL § 690.36, it was noted:
This legislation simply changes the procedures, but not the substantive legal re-
quirements, for obtaining a search warrant. Presently, the law requires that an
application for a search warrant be in writing. Thus, a police officer seeking to
obtain a warrant can expect to expend considerable time and energy attending to
the details of preparing a written application and finding a judge to review it.
Unfortunately, the police are often faced with situations where time is of the es-
sence, i.e., cases where the evidence may be lost or destroyed if a search and
seizure are not promptly effected.
Memorandum of Legislative Representative of City of New York in support of the pas-
sage of ch. 679, 1982 N.Y. Laws 2540.
Additional arguments advanced in support of this statute included furtherance of
the goal of keeping the police out of courthouses and on the streets of the community
and minimizing the instances in which warrantless searches and seizures could occur. Id.
50. 56 N.Y.2d 288, 437 N.E.2d 265, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1982).
51. Id. at 292, 437 N.E.2d at 267, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
52. Id. at 294, 437 N.E.2d at 268, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 9 (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 690.10(4) (McKinney 1971)).
53. Id. The court required, however, that certain "stringent standards" be meet
prior to issuance of the court order. The "stringent standard" test states:
[A] court order to obtain a blood sample of a suspect may issue provided the
People establish (1) probable cause to believe the suspect has committed the
crime, (2) a "clear indication" that relevant material evidence will be found, and
(3) the method used to secure it is safe and reliable. In addition, the issuing court
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/6
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III. People v. Moselle
A. Factual Background
The defendants in the three cases consolidated in People v.
Moselle" were drivers, each involved in an accident in which ei-
ther the driver or a passenger of the other vehicle was killed. In
each case, some aspect of the VTL implied consent statute had
not been complied with and a court order or the driver's consent
for the test had not been obtained, leading the intermediate
court to rule the defendant's BAC test inadmissible in VTL and
Penal Law proceedings.
1. People v. Moselle 5
Moselle was a driver involved in an accident in which the
driver of the other vehicle died.5 6 The investigating police officer
requested that Moselle submit to a blood test after detecting a
strong odor of alcohol.5 7 No evidence was presented at trial to
show that Moselle had actually consented to the blood test or
that he had been arrested or administered a breath test prior to
having his blood drawn.58 The blood test indicated a BAC of .17
of one per centum by weight.59 Moselle was charged with violat-
ing VTL section 1192(2). o
At trial, the jury was instructed that if they were to find
that the police officer had acted upon reasonable grounds in or-
dering Moselle's blood test, then the test would be admissible
evidence.61 The jury found the officer's action reasonable and
must weigh the seriousness of the crime, the importance of the evidence to the
investigation and the unavailability of less intrusive means of obtaining it, on the
one hand, against concern for the suspect's constitutional right to be free from
bodily intrusion on the other.
Id. at 291, 437 N.E.2d at 266, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
54. 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982).
55. (Erie County Ct. Dec. 7, 1981).
56. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 101, 102 n.1, 439 N.E.2d at 1236 & n.1, 454 N.Y.S.2d at
293 & n.1.
57. Id. at 102, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982). See supra note
26.
61. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 102, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
19831
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convicted Moselle.62  On appeal, the Erie County Court
reversed. 3
2. People v. Daniel6
Daniel was a driver involved in an accident in which a pas-
senger of one of the other vehicles died. 5 The investigating po-
lice officer requested that a nurse draw Daniel's blood after ob-
serving two empty bottles and one half-full cold bottle of beer in
Daniel's van.66 Actual consent was neither given by nor sought
from Daniel for the test, which established his BAC as .22 of one
per centum by weight.61 Daniel was charged with criminally
negligent homicide, a Penal Law offense, and violations of VTL
sections 1192(2) and (3).6s
In a pretrial hearing, the suppression court granted Daniel's
motion to suppress the blood test.6 ' The intermediate court af-
firmed by ruling that the implied consent statute provided the
exclusive means, absent actual consent or a court order, by
which the police could obtain a blood test from a driver."0 Non-
compliance with the provisions of the implied consent statute
negated use of the blood test.7 1 The intermediate court ruled
further that had the blood test been collected in compliance
with the provisions of the implied consent statute, it would have
been admissible in the proceedings brought under the Penal
Law.7 2
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. S4 A.D.2d 916, 446 N.Y.S.2d 658 (4th Dep't 1981).
65. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 102-03, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
66. Id. at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
67. Id. The court of appeals noted that Daniel was unconscious and not under arrest
when the blood test was initiated, and that he regained consciousness during the testing.
Id. The intermediate court made no mention of this fact. People v. Daniel, 84 A.D.2d
916, 446 N.Y.S.2d 658 (4th Dep't 1981). See infra note 125.
68. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 102-03, 439 N.E.2d at 1236-37, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293-94.
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2)-(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982). See supra note 26.
69. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
70. People v. Daniel, 84 A.D.2d at 916, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 659. This is in contrast to
the suppression court which had premised its ruling to suppress Daniel's blood test upon
finding the extraction of his blood to be in violation of his constitutional rights. Id.
71. Id. at 917, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
72. Id. The intermediate court interpreted N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195(1) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1982), see supra note 26, as the authority permitting use of a blood test
[Vol. 4:115
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3. People v. Wolter7"
The driver Wolter, involved in an accident in which the
driver of the other vehicle died, was under arrest when subjected
to a blood test that he had refused.7 4 The test indicated that
Wolter's BAC was .23 of one per centum by weight.75 Wolter was
charged with several violations of the VTL and Penal Law.7
At a pretrial suppression hearing, the court ruled Wolter's
blood test inadmissible as to the VTL charges but admissible as
to the Penal Law charges.7 On appeal, however, the intermedi-
ate court ruled the test inadmissible as to all charges, reasoning
that the implied consent statute provided the exclusive means
by which the police could obtain a BAC test from a nonconsent-
ing driver absent a court order.s Subjecting the driver to the
test despite his refusal contravened the provisions of the implied
consent statute, negating use of the test. 9
complying with the implied consent statute in any proceeding. Since the provisions of
the implied consent statute had been violated by the police officer's failure to place
Daniel under arrest or administer a breath test prior to conducting the blood test, the
test was ruled inadmissible under the Penal Law as well as VTL charges. Id.
73. 83 A.D.2d 187, 444 N.Y.S.2d 331 (4th Dep't 1981).
74. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294. The deputy
investigating the accident had ordered the blood test after detecting the odor of alcohol
about Wolter. Id.
75. Id.
76. The charges against Wolter included second degree assault, second degree man-
slaughter and the VTL offense of driving while intoxicated. Id. at 104, 439 N.E.2d at
1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
77. People v. Wolter, 83 A.D.2d 187, 188, 444 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (4th Dep't 1981).
78. Id. at 189-90, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 333. The intermediate court reasoned that al-
though "a warrantless taking of blood from a person under arrest without his consent is
undoubtedly constitutional. . ., it is not permissible to utilize the results of such a blood
test in a trial where a statute plainly indicates it shall not be taken if the subject refuses
to consent." Id. at 189, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 333. Obtaining Wolter's blood test despite his
refusal contravened the provisions of the implied consent statute and rendered the test
inadmissible in the VTL proceedings. Id. Citing People v. Daniel, 84 A.D.2d 916, 446
N.Y.S.2d 658 (4th Dep't 1981), as precedent, see supra note 72, the court further ruled
the test inadmissible in the Penal Law proceedings. People v. Wolter, 83 A.D.2d at 189-
90, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
79. People v. Wolter, 83 A.D.2d at 189-90, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
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B. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In People v. Moselle, ° the New York Court of Appeals
ruled that to be admissible in a VTL proceeding, a blood test
must comply with the provisions of the implied consent statute
in the absence of a driver's actual consent or a court order.8 ' Of
the three cases consolidated in Moselle, this issue was only
raised in regard to Moselle and Wolter. Moselle had not con-
sented to the blood test and a court order had not issued.8 2 Thus
the police officer's failure to either arrest him or administer a
breath test violated the provisions of the implied consent statute
and rendered the blood test inadmissible."3 Administration of
the blood test over Wolter's refusal, again in violation of the im-
plied consent statute, negated the use of the test in the VTL
portion of the proceedings against him."'
Contrary to the Wolter and Daniel intermediate courts,83
the court of appeals stated that the VTL implied consent statute
applied only to VTL proceedings.8 " In Penal Law proceedings, a
blood test was admissible only if collected pursuant to a court
order or an individual's actual consent.8 7 Exigent circumstances,
although perhaps excusing the failure to obtain a court order,
did "not provide a source of authority to conduct discovery."88
80. 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982).
81. Id. at 101, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
82. Id. at 102, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
83. Id. at 107, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
84. Id.
85. People v. Wolter, 83 A.D.2d 187, 444 N.Y.S.2d 331 (4th Dep't 1981), see supra
note 78 and accompanying text; People v. Daniel, 84 A.D.2d 916, 446 N.Y.S.2d 658 (4th
Dep't 1981), see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
86. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 108, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
87. Id. at 101, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
88. Id. at 109, 439 N.E.2d at 1240, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296-97. An individual's body
metabolizes alcohol over time, leading to destruction of the alcohol level in the blood. A
blood test conducted after a significant time lapse would indicate a lower BAC level than
if the test had been conducted at the scene or shortly after commission of a violation.
For this reason the implied consent statute requires the blood test be conducted within
two hours of the driver's arrest or breath test. N.Y. VEH. & TaAF. LAW § 1194(1)(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1982). See supra note 18.
If a court order were sought to obtain a driver's blood for BAC testing, the time
required to obtain the court order would most likely exceed the rate of alcohol destruc-
tion by the body, unless the court order was sought by oral application. See supra note
49 and accompanying text. This "destruction of evidence" is recognized as an emergency
situation and an exception to the warrant preference rule. Schmerber v. California, 384
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After noting the absence of a common law right to obtain a
blood test, the court inferred from the existence of the CPL dis-
covery statute a legislative intent to make a court order or statu-
tory provision the exclusive means for obtaining a blood test."
The court stated:
Any lingering doubt that this legislation was intended to blanket
the subject (except as the Legislature itself might additionally
provide) rather than merely to constitute a partial piece of special
legislative regulation is dispelled when note is taken of the last
sentence of subdivision 2: "This subdivision shall not be con-
strued to limit, expand or otherwise affect the issuance of a simi-
lar court order, as may be authorized by law, before the filing of
an accusatory instrument consistent with such rights as the de-
fendant may derive from the constitution of this state or of the
United States." (Emphasis added.) No room is then left for the
taking of samples of blood otherwise than pursuant to a court or-
der issued under CPL 240.40 or a court order otherwise author-
ized by law (or in conformity with §1194). The negative inference
is that the taking of blood in any other manner is foreclosed.90
Since neither Daniel nor Wolter had consented to have his blood
drawn, and a court order had issued in neither case, their tests
were ruled inadmissible in the Penal Law proceedings.91
The dissent concurred with the majority's application of the
implied consent statute to blood testing in VTL and Penal Law
proceedings but disagreed with its interpretation of the CPL dis-
covery statute. 2 The dissent theorized that the discovery statute
applied only to proceedings already in progress, not to a field
investigation by a police officer.93 Furthermore, the statute did
not impliedly negate other means by which a blood test might be
obtained.9 4 The dissent concluded that neither a court order, im-
plied or actual consent, nor an arrest was necessary to make a
U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966). The New York Court of Appeals recognized this "exigent cir-
cumstance" but further noted that authority for obtaining the blood must exist prior to
excusing the need of a court order. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 109, 439 N.E.2d at 1240, 454
N.Y.S.2d at 296-97.
89. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 109-10, 439 N.E.2d at 1240, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
90. Id. at 110, 439 N.E.2d at 1240, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 297 (footnotes omitted).
91. Id. at 108, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
92. Id. at 111, 439 N.E.2d at 1241, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 298 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 111-12, 439 N.E.2d at 1241, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 298 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
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blood test admissible.9 5
IV. Analysis
Prior to People v. Moselle,9 6 in the absence of actual con-
sent or a court order, a blood test obtained in violation of the
provisions of the VTL implied consent 97 statute was inadmissi-
ble in a VTL section 1192(2) 9" proceeding.9 The Moselle ruling
as to the defendant Moselle reaffirmed this.100 The Moselle court
quieted the conflict surrounding proceedings brought under
VTL section 1192(3)101 by ruling that a noncomplying blood test
was inadmissible in the VTL section 1192(3) charge against Wol-
ter.10 2 The holding in People v. Blowers,10 s that a noncomplying
blood test was admissible in VTL section 1192(3) proceedings,
was effectively overruled.
Furthermore, Moselle settled the conflict concerning the ap-
plication of the VTL implied consent statute to Penal Law pro-
ceedings.104 According to the court, the implied consent statute
provided no guidance or authority for obtaining or using a blood
test in any proceeding other than a VTL prosecution.105 The
court failed, however, to explain why it disagreed with the
Daniel intermediate court's'06 ruling that VTL section 1195(1)107
authorized the use of a complying blood test in any proceeding
95. Id. at 113-14, 439 N.E.2d at 1242-43, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 299-300 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
96. 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982).
97. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(1)-(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982). See supra notes 6
& 18 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at § 1192(2). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
99. People v. Blowers, 79 Misc. 2d 462, 465, 360 N.Y.S.2d 369, 373 (Rensselaer
County Ct. 1974).
100. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 107, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296. See supra
text accompanying notes 80-83.
101. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982). See supra notes 26
& 28-30 and accompanying text.
102. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 107, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296. See supra
text accompanying note 84.
103. 79 Misc. 2d 462, 465, 360 N.Y.S.2d 369, 373 (Rensselaer County Ct. 1974). See
supra text accompanying note 30.
104. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
105. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 108, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296. See supra
notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
106. People v. Daniel, 84 A.D.2d 916, 917, 446 N.Y.S.2d 658, 660 (4th Dep't 1981).
107. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982). See supra note 26.
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"arising out of actions alleged to have been committed by any
person arrested for a violation of any subdivision of section
eleven hundred ninety-two."10 Finally, the court required that a
driver explicitly consent to a blood test or that a court order
issue for a test in order for the test to be admissible in Penal
Law proceedings. 1 9
The court had been presented with no authority recognizing
the state's common law right to compel an individual to submit
to a blood test. 10 Absent such a common law right, the majority
required another source of authority for obtaining the test. Be-
sides the driver's actual or implied consent, the majority ruled
that a court order issued pursuant to statutory authority would
provide such authority." 1 The existence of the implied consent
and discovery statutes was, from the majority's perspective, an
indication of a legislative intent to limit an individual's right to
be free from undesired blood testing.
According to the court, the existence of the CPL discovery
statute" 2 authorizing issuance of a court order to obtain a defen-
dant's blood sample demonstrated the state's unwillingness to
obtain an individual's blood in the absence of statutory author-
ity."' Existence of the CPL discovery statute did not exclude,
however, a court order issued under another statutory author-
ity." 4 Thus a search warrant,"5 a type of court order, would be a
proper means for compelling a driver to submit to a test,"" with
108. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34. The Moselle court merely stated:
In our view, [VTL § 1195(1)] only authorizes the giving of chemical blood tests for
prosecutions for violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law; it has no application to
charges brought under sections of the Penal Law, notwithstanding that the
charged Penal Law violations arise out of the operation of a motor vehicle. To
this extent we differ with the rationale on which the Appellate Division premised
its determination in Daniel.
Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 108, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
109. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 101, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293. See supra
text accompanying note 91.
110. Id. at 109, 439 N.E.2d at 1240, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
111. Id.
112. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40(2) (McKinney 1982). See supra notes 39-42
and accompanying text.
113. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 109, 439 N.E.2d at 1240, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
114. Id. at 110, 439 N.E.2d at 1240, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
115. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 690.05(2) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1982). See supra
text accompanying note 47.
116. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 108, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
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the driver identified as the "designated person," '117 and the
driver's blood the "designated property" 118 "tend[ing] to demon-
strate that an offense [had been] committed,"11 9 the offense be-
ing a violation of the VTL or Penal Law. Such a court order
could be sought by oral application.12 0
The dissent disagreed with the majority's ruling in Moselle
that the absence of actual consent or a court order negated use
of a blood test in Penal Law prosecutions; 21 no specific source of
authority need exist for the test, for an individual had no consti-
tutional right to refuse the test."s2 Thus from the dissent's per-
spective, the existence of the implied consent and discovery stat-
utes merely represented methods by which the state afforded an
individual greater protection than that guaranteed by the
Constitution.
The positions of the majority and dissent reflect the dichot-
omy initially recognized in New York toward the state's right to
draw an individual's blood for testing.1 23 Although the commis-
sion drafting the implied consent statute believed, as did the
dissent, that an individual had no right to refuse a test, it incor-
porated into the 1953 statute the state attorney general's posi-
tion that in the absence of actual or implied consent, a blood
test should not be administered.1 2 This was the Moselle court's
position. The result was that an individual's interest in being
free from forced bodily intrusion was valued above the state's
interest in obtaining a blood test.
The dissent in Moselle foreshadowed the growing dissatis-
faction with the judicial and legislative reluctance to force an
individual to submit to a blood test. The dissent would have put
no restrictions on the state's right to obtain the test. The dissent
117. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 690.05(2) (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1982). See supra
text accompanying note 47.
118. Id.
119. Id. at § 690.10(4) (McKinney 1971). See supra text accompanying note 48.
120. Id. at § 690.35(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982). See supra note 49 and accompany-
ing text.
121. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 111, 439 N.E.2d at 1241, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 298 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
122. Id. at 112-14, 439 N.E.2d at 1242-43, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 299-300 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
123. See supra notes 3 & 14-15 and accompanying text.
124. Id.
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maintained that not only was an arrest unnecessary, 1 5 a require-
ment under Schmerber v. California,s6 but a court order, 27 a
125. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 114, 439 N.E.2d at 1243, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 299-300 (Jasen,
J., dissenting). Daniel had argued that since he had not been under arrest when his blood
was extracted, the blood test should be suppressed. The dissent stated that since an
individual has no constitutional right to be arrested, a driver can not expect a police
officer to guess when enough evidence has been gathered to establish probable cause to
arrest the driver. Id. at 114, 439 N.E.2d at 1243, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 300 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
Although the court of appeals noted that Daniel had been unconscious when his
blood test was initiated, id. at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293, the court
had not been presented with the issue of how unconsciousness affects an arrest. The
prosecution in Daniel had conceded that the defendant Daniel had not been arrested
prior to administration of the blood test; thus the court had no reason to discuss this
issue. People v. Daniel, 84 A.D.2d at 916, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
In People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 111, 324 N.E.2d 872, 876, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509, 515
(1975), the court stated: "Whenever an individual is physically or constructively detained
by virtue of a significant interruption of his liberty of movement as a result of police
action, that individual has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
Id. In People v. McGroder, 81 Misc. 2d 1081, 1082-83, 367 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (Webster
Town Ct. 1975), the court relied upon Cantor when it held that a blood test extracted
from an unconscious driver complied with the arrest requirement of the implied consent
statute, thus yielding a blood test admissible in a VTL proceeding. The court observed
that the conduct of the driver and the police officer dictated that the driver's "liberty
had been restrained," thus the unconscious driver was under arrest. Id. at 1083, 367
N.Y.S.2d at 716. Accord People v. Curran, 90 A.D.2d 661, 456 N.Y.S.2d 281 (3d Dep't
1982).
The McGroder court also addressed the issue of whether an unconscious driver can
be deemed to have refused a blood test. The court noted that a driver's actual refusal is
required to prevent the test from being conducted; actual consent to the test is not re-
quired by the implied consent statute. Id. at 1083, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 716-17. See also
People v. Kates, 77 A.D.2d 417, 433 N.Y.S.2d 938 (4th Dep't 1980), aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 591,
428 N.E.2d 852, 444 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1981).
New York has yet to decide the issue of the admissibility of a blood test taken from
an unconscious driver who, upon regaining consciousness, refuses a test which has al-
ready been performed. People v. McGroder, 81 Misc. 2d at 1083, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
126. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
127. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 113, 439 N.E.2d at .1242, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 299 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting). The dissent reasoned that the CPL discovery statute for issuance of a court
order to obtain a blood sample from a defendant had no application to a field investiga-
tion conducted by a police officer. Id. at 111, 439 N.E.2d at 1241, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 298
(Jasen, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the mere existence of this statute did not negate
other means of obtaining a blood test from a driver. "There simply is no basis, either in
the express language of the statute or its legislative history, for the majority's conclusion
that CPL 240.40 pre-empts authorization for blood tests administered in the course of a
criminal investigation to determine whether there has been a violation of the Penal
Law." Id. at 112, 439 N.E.2d at 1242, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 299 (Jasen, J., dissenting). The
dissent would have relied upon the exigent circumstance of a time lapse resulting in the
destruction of evidence to "justif[y] the immediate, warrantless removal of the blood
19
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requirement under In re Abe A., 28 was unnecessary as well.
The legislature enacted VTL section 1194-a 12 9 in response
to Moselle's result: the suppression of drivers' BAC tests in
cases involving deceased or seriously injured victims.'30 The leg-
islature adopted the dissent's view that a driver has no right to
refuse a blood test but tempered it by limiting the test to situa-
tions where someone other than the driver was killed or suffered
serious physical injury. 181 The legislature also tailored the new
statute to the framework defined by the majority by requiring
sample from the suspect's body." Id. at 113, 439 N.E.2d at 1242, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 299
(Jasen, J., dissenting). But see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
128. 56 N.Y.2d 288, 437 N.E.2d 265, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1982). See supra notes 50-53
and accompanying text.
129. Compulsory Chemical Tests for Intoxication, ch. 481, § 1194-a, 1983 N.Y. Laws
882, 883-84 (effective Oct. 15, 1983) (new provision) [hereinafter cited as VTL § 1194-al,
provides in part:
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of
this chapter, no person who operates a motor vehicle in this state may refuse to
submit to a chemical test of his breath, blood, urine or saliva for the purpose of
determining the alcoholic or drug content of his blood when a court order for such
chemical test has been issued in accordance with the provisions of this section.
2. Upon refusal by any person to submit to a chemical test as described above
the test shall not be given unless, a police officer or a district attorney, as defined
in subdivision thirty-two of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law, requests
and obtains a court order to compel a person to submit to a chemical test to deter-
mine the alcoholic or drug content of his blood upon a finding of reasonable cause
to believe that:
(a) such person was the operator of a motor vehicle and in the course of such
operation a person other than the operator was killed or suffered serious physical
injury as defined in section 10.00 of the penal law; and
(b) (1) either such person operated the vehicle in violation of any subdivision
of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this chapter, or
(2) a breath test administered by a police officer in accordance with sec-
tion eleven hundred ninety-three-a of this chapter indicates that alcohol has been
consumed by such person; and
(c) such person has been placed under lawful arrest; and
(d) such person has refused to submit to a chemical test requested in accor-
dance with the provisions of subdivision two of section eleven hundred ninety-four
of this chapter or is unable to give his consent to such a test.
VTL § 1194-a(1)-(2).
130. See New York State Assembly Memorandum in Support of Legislation -
Purpose or General Idea of Bill, accompanying Bill No. 4178, enacted as Compulsory
Chemical Tests for Intoxication, ch. 481, 1983 N.Y. Laws 882.
131. VTL § 1194-a(2)(a). Serious physical injury is defined as "physical injury which
creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted dis-
figurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily organ." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(10) (McKinney 1975).
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the issuance of a court order to obtain the test.'32
A driver's refusal of a BAC test authorized by the implied
consent statute triggers VTL section 1194-a.13 3 Under this sec-
tion, a police officer or district attorney may request a court or-
der to obtain an individual's BAC test, and this court order may
issue "upon a finding of reasonable cause to believe' 3 " each of
the following:
• the individual was a driver,
" someone other than this individual was killed or suffered serious
physical injury,
• either the individual violated VTL section 1192... or the indi-
vidual's breath test indicated consumption of alcohol,
• the individual was under lawful arrest, and
• either the individual refused the test authorized by the implied
consent statute or the individual was unable to refuse the test.3 6
"Reasonable cause" exists if from the totality of the circum-
stances it appears that the individual violated VTL section
1192.' s7
A VTL section 1194-a court order may be issued only by
specifically designated justices or judges.138 This restriction is an
132. VTL § 1194-a(1). See supra note 129.
133. Id. at § 1194-a(2). See supra note 129.
134. Id.
135. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192 (McKinney 1982). See supra note 26 for rele-
vant provisions of the statute.
136. VTL § 1194-a(2)(a)-(d). See supra note 129.
137. VTL § 1194-a(2) provides:
For the purposes of this section "reasonable cause" shall be determined by
viewing the totality of circumstances surrounding the incident which, when taken
together, indicate that the operator was driving in violation of section eleven hun-
dred ninety-two of this chapter. Such circumstances may include, but are not lim-
ited to: evidence that the operator was operating a motor vehicle in violation of
any provision of this article or any other moving violation at the time of the inci-
dent; any visible indication of alcohol or drug consumption or impairment by the
operator; the existence of an open container containing an alcoholic beverage in or
around the vehicle driven by the operator; any other evidence surrounding the
circumstances of the incident which indicate that the operator had been operating
a motor vehicle while impaired by the consumption of alcohol or drugs or intoxi-
cated at the time of the incident.
Id. N.Y. VEiH. & TRA. LAW § 1192 (McKinney 1982). See supra note 26 for relevant
provisions of the statute.
138. VTL § 1194-a(3)(a) provides:
An application for a court order to compel submission to a chemical test may
be made to any supreme court justice, county court judge or district court judge in
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attempt to guarantee that only officials with sufficient apprecia-
tion of the intrusion resulting from compelling an individual to
submit to a blood test are able to grant the court order.139 The
application for the court order can be communicated to the jus-
tice or judge "by telephone, radio or other means of electronic
communication, or in person."'I4 The statute even mandates
that the chief administrator of the courts establish a schedule
whereby a justice or judge is always available to consider the
oral application."" The legislature appropriately addressed the
necessity of quick action to prevent the loss of evidence.14 2
Although providing the state with a means of obtaining a
driver's blood test after a refusal, VTL section 1194-a necessi-
tates compliance with several procedural mandates.' 3 These
the judicial district in which the incident occurred, or if the incident occurred in
the city of New York before any supreme court justice or judge of the criminal
court of the city of New York. Such application may be communicated by tele-
phone, radio or other means of electronic communication, or in person.
Id.
139. Telephone interview with Christopher A. Cernik, Esq., Program & Comm.
Staff, N.Y. State Assembly (July 19, 1983).
140. VTL § 1194-a(3). See supra note 138. Compare this with N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAW
§ 690.36(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982) which provides a similar provision for oral applica-
tions. See supra note 49.
141. VTL § 1194-a(3)(f) provides: "The chief administrator of the courts shall es-
tablish a schedule to provide that a sufficient number of judges or justices will be availa-
ble in each judicial district to hear oral applications for court orders as permitted by this
section." Id.
142. Accord supra note 88.
143. VTL § 1194-a(2)(a)-(d). See supra notes 129, 133-34, 136-37 and accompanying
text. In fact, "[i]t may be argued that simpler procedures should be available. However,
the bill represents a substantial advance in the present'law and will facilitate the effec-
tive prosecution of intoxicated or impaired drivers under the Penal Law where there is
serious physical injury or death."
Governor's Memorandum issued'upon approval of Compulsory Chemical Tests for
Intoxication, ch. 481, 1983 N.Y. Laws A-577.
According to the Memorandum of Legislative Representative of City of New York in
support of the passage of Compulsory Chemical Tests for Intoxication, ch. 481, 1983
N.Y. Laws A-551, -552, the reasons for supporting the Law are:
Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) data derived from such samples would make
it easier to assign culpability in traffic accidents that result in death or serious
physical injury, and facilitate effective prosecution of such cases.
Furthermore, it would enable accurate reporting on the incidence of the involve-
ment of alcohol with motor vehicle fatalities and serious injuries.
It is widely believed by Highway Safety experts that the incidence of alcohol in-
volvement in motor vehicle fatalities and injuries is under-reported. If we are to
develop effective strategies, to deal with the problem of the drinking driver, the
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procedural requirements delineate the limitations of the applica-
bility of the statute. For example, a court order will not issue if
only the driver under suspicion of DWI is killed or suffers seri-
ous physical injury, 144 or if a victim suffers injury which is not
serious.145 Nor will a court order issue if the individual who was
the driver can not be identified as such. 146
If a VTL section 1194-a court order cannot be obtained,147
may a court order to obtain a driver's blood test issue upon
other statutory authority? The Moselle court ruled that a court
order issued pursuant to the search warrant provisions of the
CPL would be a proper means of obtaining a blood test from a
driver provided there was: "(1) probable cause to believe the
suspect ha[d] committed the crime, (2) a 'clear indication' that
relevant material evidence [would] be found, and (3) the method
used to secure it [was] safe and reliable.' 114 8
The admissibility of a blood test obtained by a search war-
rant in vehicular assault and homicide Penal Law proceedings
following the passage of VTL section 1194-a will depend upon
whether the statute is interpreted as providing the exclusive
statutory means of obtaining a blood test from a nonconsenting
driver for these proceedings. The argument favoring the exclu-
sivity of section 1194-a would brand the passage of the statute
as pre-emptory of any other means by which a blood test could
be obtained. Thus, to be admissible in these proceedings, the
blood test would have to be obtained pursuant to a section
1194-a court order.
The argument favoring the admissibility of a blood test ob-
tained pursuant to a search warrant in these proceedings would
parallel that for the CPL discovery statute - a court order is-
sued pursuant to the statute is not meant to prevent issuance of
a similar court order.4 9 Furtherance of the legislative intent of
full extent of the problem must be known.
Id.
144. VTL § 1194-a(2)(a). See supra note 129.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., supra text accompanying, notes 144-46.
148. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 108, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296 (citing In
re Abe A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 291, 437 N.E.2d 265, 266, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7 (1982), see supra
note 53).
149. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 109-10, 439 N.E.2d at 1240, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 297. See
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obtaining a blood test from a driver involved in a serious acci-
dent would favor this interpretation. Section 1194-a has numer-
ous procedural subdivisions;150 failure to comply with any one of
them prevents the use of the blood test in prosecutions for seri-
ous offenses. 151
The Moselle court had ruled that the VTL provides no
guidance or authority for obtaining or using a blood test in Pe-
nal Law proceedings. 52 Section 1194-a overrules this aspect of
Moselle for the Penal Law offenses of vehicular assault and
homicide. 158 Therefore, the ruling of Moselle still stands for
other Penal Law offenses: VTL section 1194-a has no effect on
the admissibility of a blood test in other Penal Law proceedings.
If section 1194-a were to be interpreted as the exclusive author-
ity for issuance of a court order to obtain a driver's blood test,
the only Penal Law proceedings affected by a violation of section
1194-a would be vehicular assault and homicide. Thus, a search
warrant would yield a blood test admissible in other Penal Law
proceedings brought against a driver. Obviously, this narrow in-
terpretation of section 1194-a fails to advance the legislative pol-
icy of obtaining a driver's blood test for use in serious offenses.
Interpreting section 1194-a in this manner, therefore, ignores the
very reason the statute was enacted: to guarantee that the
state's interest in obtaining a blood test in serious accidents
would outweigh the interest of an individual driver seeking to
avoid a test.
supra text accompanying note 90.
150. VTL § 1194-a(2)(a)-(d). See supra notes 129, 133-34, 136-37 and accompanying
text.
151. See Compulsory Chemical Tests for Intoxication, ch. 481, § 1195(3), 1983 N.Y.
Laws 882, 885 (new provision) [hereinafter cited as VTL § 1195(3)], provides a means to
suppress a blood test which fails to comply with VTL § 1194-a:
A defendant who has been compelled to submit to a chemical test pursuant to
the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four-a of this chapter may move
for the suppression of such evidence in accordance with article seven hundred ten
of the criminal procedure law on the grounds that the order was obtained and the
test administered in violation of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-
four-a of this chapter or any other applicable law.
VTL § 1195(3) (footnote omitted).
152. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 108, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296. See supra
text accompanying note 86.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
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V. Conclusion
In People v. Moselle, T the court ruled that a driver's actual
consent, a court order, or compliance with the provisions of the
VTL implied consent statute yielded a blood test admissible in
VTL proceeding. The court held, however, that the VTL implied
consent statute had no application to the Penal Law. Thus, only
a driver's actual consent or a court order yielded a blood test
admissible in Penal Law proceedings. The court required statu-
tory authority for the issuance of a court order seeking a blood
test from a driver.
The legislature enacted VTL section 1194-a' 5 5 in response
to the result of Moselle: the suppression of blood tests which
proved drivers, responsible for the deaths of others, to be clini-
cally intoxicated. This section provides statutory authority for
the issuance of a court order to obtain a driver's blood test. Issu-
ance of the court order is contingent, however, upon certain fac-
tors, including a refusal of the test by the driver, the driver's
being under arrest, and someone other than the driver having
been seriously injured or killed. Thus, the court order will issue
only if it appears that the driver will be charged with vehicular
assault or vehicular homicide.
In dictum, the Moselle court reasoned that a CPL search
warrant was valid statutory authority for obtaining a driver's
blood test. The underlying requirements for obtaining a search
warrant are less stringent than for obtaining a section 1194-a
court order. The courts will have to decide whether Moselle's
dictum survives the enactment of section 1194-a or whether sec-
tion 1194-a now provides the sole authority for obtaining a
driver's blood test.
Section 1194-a represents an erosion of the policy in effect
in New York since the enactment of the implied consent statute.
In accidents involving serious injury of an innocent victim, sec-
tion 1194-a favors the state's interest in obtaining a blood test
over the driver's interest in avoiding the test. This statute does
not, however, overlook the driver's interest totally. The state
must still obtain a court order before compelling the individual
154. 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982).
155. VTL § 1194-a. See supra note 129.
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to submit to the test. Furthermore, the court order will only is-
sue if specific procedural safeguards favoring the interest of the
driver are complied with. Nevertheless, the legislature has em-
barked upon a course which may ultimately bring the state pol-
icy in line with the policy recognized in Schmerber v. Califor-
nia:15" that a driver suspected of the criminal offense of DWI has
no constitutional right to refuse a blood test.
Laura Ellen Carabillo
156. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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